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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW.

The Truw Constitution. J. C. C. This article is of interest as a type
of many now appearing in our periodical literature, legal and nonlegal. It is an attempt to work out the theory of nationality along
newv lines, which are vaguely perceived, and therefore not clearly
stated. In these articles the constitutional theories of James Wilson
are cited and his doctrine spoken of-as in this instance-- that of
"Hamilton and Wilson." INo more complete error could he made.
No one who has more than superficially examined the theories held
by James Wilson could speak of the theories of these two men as
making one common doctrine. Mr. Wilson's constitutional theories
seem rather to dazzle than enlighten those who take them u p chiefly
as a means of re-enforcing their own prejudices in favor ofecertain
interpretations of the constitution. Mr. Wilson had a broad, rational,
well defined, theory of constitutional interpretation, hut one that
does not lend support to the extreme exponents of either of the two
theories which have for so many years divided the sentiments of the
country between them. A strong believer in the rights of the states,
Mr. Wilson cannot successfully be exploited by those who would concentrate all power in the nation; an ardent nationalist, he cannot
he used to emphasize the theory of state sovereignty. A most devoted
believer in the people; in government by the people; in the sovereignty
of the people, he can he brought forward with success solely by those
who in this day, desire, as in his day desired, to establish and confirm them in that sovereignty.
The American Lawyer, December, pp. 545-'549.

The Next Constitutional Convention of the United States. Hon.
Walter Clark. It may sound somewhat strange to hear the Constitutional Convention of 1787 called "reactionary," yet Judge Clark
is probably justified in so calling it in contra-distinction to that which
put forth the Declaration of Independence. In that convention were
met men of Hamilton's type, distrustful of their fellow men-perhaps
naturally so, under the circumstances-, and desirous of an hereditary
executive. Yet men of Htamilton's type were not prevalent or even
p redominant in that convention, and readers of the debates would
behard to convince that they were wholly opposed to democracy.
It is true that some of the wishes of the greater men were disregarded;
the instrument had to be formed on the level of the majority, naturally
a much lower plane. Men like James Wilson felt -eenly that the
election of senators through the intervention of the state legislatures
or any other medium was a fault so grave that they only consented
to accept it because to refuse was to fail of any constitution at all.
But in spite of these things they had been immensely successful in
keeping faith with the people. Had their interpretation of the instrument they had helped to form been accepted the omission of a Bill
of Rights, which Judge Clark thinks so undemocratic, the omission
would not have neededto be made good. It is true, as Judge Clark
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says, that the Federal Constitution was adopted 119 years ago and is
entirely unchanged. It is also true that every state has revised its
constitution since that time. But what state at thi day has a constitution superior to that of the United States? It is true that the
governing power is not exercised by the people. It is not so true that
it is not, as yet, in the hands of the people. At present the people
believe that the majority governs through the medium of the dominate political party; its legislatures and its Congress, with its president. Once thoroughly convince the greater portion of the people
that this is not the case, and it will be very quickly shown wherein
the power does reside. Judge Clark's apparent preference for the
English form of government as placing the power in the elected representatives of the people, as shown in the House of Commons is somewhat contradicted by recent history; the House of Lords defies the
House of Commons and the greatest majority in its history and forbids all legislation inimical to its interests. In England as in this
country the "vested interests" control legislation.
We are told that "the election of senators should be given to the
people." Many of the framers of the constitution were convinced
that this should be the case. But who is to give the power to elect
them to the people, if that power has already passed out of their hands?
Not the people of that class who already hold the power, if Judge
Clark is right, for they would be last to dispossess themselves of any
power they now hold.
Judge Clark desires the election of senators by direct vote of the
people, a new apportionment for senators, a change in the method
of electing the president, and a change in the presidential term. He
denies the power of the Sapreme Court to declare statutes unconstitutional, and does not believe that the constitutional members intended it to have that power, although such men as Madison and
Wilson favored it.
Judge Clark is inspired by a deep feeling of devotion to the constitution and the rights of the people under it, and his arguments for the
reforms in which he believes are clear and earnest.

CONTRACTS.

The Docirine of Boston Ice Company v. Potter. Geoige P. Costigan,
Jr. Since the decision of this case in r877 it has become well known
in both court and class room. Mr. Costigan has taken it up "to
examine a dictum of the court which has been taken to mean that
since the defendant was dissatisfied with the manner of the supply
of ice by the plaintiff under the former arrangement, hi might have
refused to deal with the plAintiff as assignee of the Citizen's Ice Coinp ny's contract, if he had been notified in time of the assignment."
The assignability of the contract is then considered. Under the present
law of Massachusetts it appears that as the "assignee of a non-negotiable legal chose in action, the plaintiff could recover. The validity
of the assignment is first considered, The conclusion is that the
Boston Ice Company was "entitled to all the rights of assignee of the
contract of the defendant of the Citizen's Ice Company." The second
question is "Was the Boston Ice Company entitled to recover on
quasi-contract principles? The plaintiff could not recover, in Massachusetts, if it was in the wrong because of the concealment practised.
"But" asks Mr. Costigan, "Even in Massachusetts, are there not
relative degrees of badness?" He thinks the Boston Ice Company
"only mildly bad or generally praiseworthy," and a recovery under
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similar circumstances has been allowed in.tother jurisdictions.

it is

another doctrine of the Massachusetts courts that one may evade
quasi-contractual liability in some instances by constantly denying
any liability. In the case under consideration the defendant never
had a chance to protest against liability to the plaintiff, but this fact
is immaterial in Massachusetts, if only the plaintiff was not officious
injacting." So it all comes back to the assignment, because, if the
plaintiff had legal rights as assignee, he was not only not officious
but the deft -idant owed him the kind of legal duty which .
could be the basis of a quasi-contractual obligation against a defendant." In concluding Mr. Costigan says:."The upshot of our whole discussion may be stated in two pro-

positions:

i. If the Court's notion that the express contract was not assignable could by any possibility be correct, the decision in Boston Ice
Company v. Potter would be erroneous because the plaintiff, reasonably believing itself entitled to act as assignee, was not an officious
intermeddler, and, having no remedy on the express contract, was
entitled to recover in quasi-contract.
2. if, however, the court was wrong in thinking the contract not
assignable to plaintiff, and that it was wrong we have already seen,
the decision in the Boston Ice Company case was perfectly sound
because the plaintiff, having already an adequate remedy on the
express contract in its assignor's name, had no excuse for -sking that
a quasi-contractual obligation be imposed upon the defendant.
- It is submitted that in Boston Ice Company v. Potter the contract
was assignable to plaintiff; that it actually was assigned to plaintiff:
that plaintiff had an adequate remedy on the express contract in its
assignor's name; that the plaintiff's remedy on the express contract
precluded any quasi-contractual obligation:' and that because at that
time in Massachusetts the assignee of a contract could not sue in his
own name on the express contract the case was rightly decided."
Cohwnbia Law Review. January,PP. 32-49-

JUDIcIAL DEcisioN.
Evolution of the Law by JudicialDecision. Robert G. Street.
The
article opens with some very striking extracts from Maine, Amos,
Cicero, and a judicial opinion by Judge Lowrie of this state. The
extracts are intended to establish the proposition that public opinion
is the source of all law, and to show that law is responsive to public
opinon.
As an agency in the development of our system of law, the Civil
and Roman law is recognized as most important and our debt to them
is acknowledged. The existence of certain legal fictions "opposed to
the intelligence and common sense of the age" is noted and also the
unfortunate fact that many of these erroneous conceptions were propounded in Biackstone's Commentaries, and are perpetuated by
lawyers from generation to generation. Some of these are, "The
Common Law is the perfection of reason" (Coke, of course, but exploited
by Blackstone) "the courts have nothing to do with considerations
of public policy," "precedents must be followed unless fatally absurd
or unjust." Mr. Street controverts all these opziions; he contends
that the acceptance of all these and kindred maxims has tended to
"retard the development of our own system of jurisprudence," and
that "the elementary writers also, with rare exceptions, present the
profession with mere digests of the decisions, conveniently classified and
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arranged; and on questions where the courts have differed, generally
content themselves with weighing authority by merely citing the
number of cases on the respective sides of the question." He asks,
Can the claim made that this adhesion to precedent makes for certainty in the law be substantiated? He answers this in the words
of the report made to the American Bar Association in x886, "It is
chaos."
In the second instalment of his article Mr. Street presents his idea in
an interesting and at the same time very valuable manner. He believes
that the course of judicial decision, hampered by a too servile attendance on precedent, has not kept pace with our individual and civic
progress. He demonstrates his theory by good reasoning, original
thought and with literary ability. He again warns us against the
"erroneous theories perpetrated by Blackstone," and'in one phrase
sums up his indictment against these worn out maxims of the law,
"Ignorance and indolence delight in formula."
American Lawyer, November, pp. 490-494, December, pp. 554-56o.

INTENT.

The Modern Conception of Animus. Brooke"Ad-Ims. "Law is a
resultant of social forces." This phrase taken from the article, shortly
defines its general trend. A first perusal may incline one to the belief
that there is in it much that is new and perhaps startling. A second
examination may rather leave the impression that here we have, not
o much new matter, or even a new point of view, as an original system
of presentation of the subject matter. It is contended that Mr. Justice
Holmes' theory that "The law has nothing to do with the actual
state of the parties minds
. . . It must go by 'externals and
judge parties by their conduct" while in one sense a truism, is, taken
in its popular signification "open to criticism." That in fact the law
is always primarily engaged with the state of the parties minds, and
only secondarily with acts which are but the effects of volition; and
therefore no more than evidence of the mind's action, which is the
matter in issue. As "it is the animus which controls human actions,
and it is therefore animus which limits legal responsibility," proof of
the animus is the thing which courts have Fttempted to controL Mr.
Adams own theory is that this control has in all times been exercised
by the classes most powerful in the community. In the days of the
ecclesiastical power the church controlled the proof; sharing its power
with the secular courts which were controlled by the military class;
these being in time superceded by the landowners; they by the capital
ists; and it seems to be implied, though not stated, thlt these latter
are being superceded by a power not directly named, which has succeeded in securing legislation inimical to the capitalists, and which,
by this theory must be now held to be succeeding to the dominant
position, and to hold in its hands the power to adduce or suppress
proof.
It is probable that this theory and the line of reasoning supporting
it,' so long as it is confined to the demonstration of the development
of the law of treason, or even the criminal law, will meet with slight
resistance in the mind of the average reader, but when the same
reasoning is used in connection with the law of trespass, a recoil of
many minds from the logic accepted in the former cases is easily conceivable. It is here that the theory first strikes at our modern law.
It does this, however, in a manner that is both forcible and interesting,
as well as able.
The Green Bag. January, pp. 12-2 3 .
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The Legal Aspect of Monopoly. Herbert Pope. "Monopoly
viewed as size sufficient to give control of the market in a particular
trade or industry may be accomplished in more than one way." Mr.
Pope says this, and then goes on. to ask, "'Does the law object to
size, control of the market, in itself, or only of a particular method
of accomplishing size, or is size not taken into account at all ?"
The invalidity of certain contracts between competitors, because
in restraint of trade, are first considered, then contracts of sale
between competitors, and contracts for the purpose of controlling
bnd regulating the conduct of their competing interests. The examination is thorough, and Mr. Pope reaches the conclusion, that -"Some monopolies must be tolerated unless all roads leading to
monopoly are closed. If that cannot be done without interfering
with the ordinary methods of competition, then the only course left is
not to prohibit altogether size which gives control of the market,
but to restrict the uses which may be made of size and limit the
competitive power of size to perpetuate itself regardless of the
interests of the general public. The success of a competitor, where
competition is still active, is the gain of the purchasing or consuming
public. But success which is so secure that the public may be disregarded must be controlled. The competitive system is maintained,
not merely for the benefit of the successful competitor, but te serve
the welfare of the whole community. The public is interested, not
in the success of any one competitor, but in the continuous and
effective operation of free competition, active and potential. When
such restraining influences are no longer effective, so that the
interests of the successful competitor and those of the public no
longer correspond, the public interests must be protected in some
other way.
t may then become necessary by means of legislation
to control the power and regulate the conduct of all large corporations, no matter what their past history."
HarvardLaw Rencwe, January, pp. x67-191.

